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Volume 27, Number 1, 2025
Volume 27, Number 1, 2025
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Home / Archives / All Issues / Volume 22, Number 2, 2020
Volume 22, Number 2, 2020 << Back
Journal of Economics and Development, Vol. 22 No. 2, pp. 335-342 | DOI 10.1108/JED-03-2020-0022

Ownership structure and demand for independent directors: evidence from an emerging market

Quoc Trung Tran

Abstract:

Purpose
In this study, we examine how ownership structure affects the use of independent directors in Vietnam – an emerging stock market.

Design/methodology/approach
We develop logit and tobit regression models to investigate the effects of ownership structure on the propensity to use independent directors and the number of independent directors on the board, respectively. Insider ownership and the use of independent directors are proposed to have a non-linear relationship.

Findings
With a sample of 1,318 observations collected from 192 listed firms over the period from 2008 to 2017, we find that insider ownership and independent director appointment have a U-shaped relationship. It is positive when insiders hold a small proportion of shares, and turns out to be negative when insiders hold a large percentage of shares. In addition, both state ownership and foreign ownership are negatively related to firm decisions of appointing independent directors.

Practical implications
Our findings imply that minority shareholders should have appropriate actions to reduce agency costs and protect their own interests. In addition, policymakers should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance legislation to increase the presence of independent directors in order to protect minority shareholders. Moreover, government agencies also need to increase the number of independent directors in state-controlled firms as a means to improve their corporate governance. Foreign investors may be a substitute for independent directors; therefore, firms without independent directors are able to improve their corporate governance by attracting foreign investors.

Originality/value
While the extant literature shows that independent directors can help firms decrease agency costs of equity in financial decisions and performance, there are relatively few studies investigating corporate decisions to use independent directors. This paper contributes to the literature of corporate governance mechanisms through independent directors in emerging markets.

Keywords:Ownership structure, Independent directors, Emerging market, Vietnam
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